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Abstract 18 
Scholz (in press) proposes how Brunswik’s lens model can be extended to account for planning 19 
of sustainable transitions of complex system. In this commentary, an alternative extension is 20 
proposed, according to which planning is seen as a process that unfolds in three steps. The first 21 
step can be understood with a model construction lens: A planning team builds a 22 
representation, that is, a model of a (distal) complex system. In a second step, modeled with a 23 
planning lens, the team contrasts its representation of the system with possible alternative 24 
states, and simulates how the is-state could be transformed into an ought-state. In a third step, 25 
modeled with an implementation lens, the team selects and implements a set of actions, 26 
thereby leaving the “imaginary space” (Konrad Lorenz) and entering the real world.  27 
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Cognition comprises perception and action, or more precisely, action control. When we grasp a 31 
coffee mug, we continuously coordinate perception and action during this process. 32 
Conceptualized in the Kantian dualistic heritage, some objective reality is mentally represented, 33 
and this representation steers our behavior in an attempt to modify this reality to serve our 34 
goals, needs, and desires. While the mug was initially on the table, it will ultimately be at our 35 
mouth so that we can drink. The human species made a step of tremendous importance in its 36 
history when our ancestors could decouple representation and action. This decoupling allowed 37 
for nothing less than, as Konrad Lorenz (1943) put it, handling in the imaginary space (orig.: 38 
“Hantieren im Vorstellungsraum”), that is, performing mental operations instead of physical 39 
operations. Planning is, at bottom, mental simulation. An objective reality is mentally 40 
represented, that is, a model of reality is constructed. Within this representation, mental 41 
operations are performed, the outcomes of these “actions” are simulated in the “imaginary 42 
space”, and among the resulting outcomes the most desirable one is identified and selected. 43 
Subsequently, a decision has to be made whether or not one wants to proceed from mind to 44 
muscles, that is, from mental operations to real actions. 45 
In the target paper of the present commentary, Scholz (in press) proposes how Brunswik’s (e.g., 46 
1952) theory of probabilistic functionalism (TPF) can be used to conceptualize and to aid 47 
planning in teams. After having laid out the basic principles of TPF (in his Section 2), and after 48 
having linked it to current biophysical and neurological models of visual perception (Section 3), 49 
Scholz discusses—based on his rich experience in urban, regional, and industrial planning, 50 
gained through numerous case studies that he and his colleagues conducted—how TPF can be 51 
used to understand and to support planning teams’ endeavors to cope with the cognitive 52 
challenges of rapid sustainable transitioning (Section 4). In Sections 5 and 6, Scholz evaluates 53 
and discusses his approach. The target paper is laudable and deserves attention. It makes two 54 
important novel contributions, specifically, it builds two bridges. First, it links TPF to 55 
contemporary visual perception research, thereby not only filling a gap in Brunswik’s own work 56 
(who, as Scholz points out, largely ignored biological aspects), but also a gap in visual 57 
perception research (that largely ignored the psychology of Egon Brunswik). Second, Scholz 58 
expands TPF to planning, thereby focusing on an area, namely action, that Brunswik was well 59 
aware of but did not pay as much attention to as he did to perception. Conversely, it seems fair 60 
to say that theoretical and practical approaches to planning have, so far, not paid much 61 
attention to Brunswik’s framework of psychology.    62 
In the present commentary, I present and discuss two extensions of the lens model. The first 63 
extension has been proposed by Leary (1987) and will be introduced next. In a second step, I 64 
propose how Leary’s idea can be even further extended to better cover the issue of planning. I 65 
do not claim that these two extensions are contradicting anything Scholz said. But even if these 66 
extensions were perfectly in line with his ideas, they may still be useful to better understand 67 
and appreciate his contributions. Third, after having presented those extensions, I will 68 
encourage both conceptual and empirical work that pits the ideas presented in Scholz (in press) 69 
and in the present commentary against each other. 70 
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To reiterate, cognition comprises perception and action. Brunswik had a clear focus on 71 
perception, which also explains why almost all the literature (including Brunswik’s own 72 
writings) that discusses the lens model depicts a double lens whose left side refers to some 73 
distal stimulus (or variable) and whose right side refers to the organism’s perception of that 74 
stimulus. The area between distal stimulus and proximal cues is located in the environment, 75 
and the area between the proximal cues and the perception of the object is conceived to be 76 
within the organism. Organism and environment meet each other in the lens, that is, in the 77 
sensory organs. Put differently, the sensory organs (e.g., the eye) are like gulfs through which 78 
the environment enters the organism. On the one side, the retina consists of cells built and 79 
maintained by the organism; and hence belongs to the organism. On the other side, light from 80 
the environment enters the eye and creates an image on the retina; and hence the pattern of 81 
arousal on the retina can be seen as a part of the environment.1 82 
Consistent with Tolman and Brunswik (1935), Leary (1987) proposed that this perceptual lens 83 
can be complemented by a behavioral lens (Figure 1). The joint functioning of perception and 84 
behavior (or action) can then be portrayed as follows: The distal object, for instance, a coffee 85 
mug, is depicted on the very left. It is perceived through some senses whose input can be 86 
conceived of as proximal cues. The integration of these cues ultimately leads to a 87 
representation of that object (referred to as central response in Figure 1). Now the organism 88 
can do something with the mug, for instance, put it in the dish washer to have a clean room, or 89 
use it to get and drink some more coffee. Such actions, which can be seen as means to reach 90 
goals, are represented by the behavioral lens. Figure 1 can also be read from the right to the 91 
left side: The inner perception of being thirsty may lead to the goal of drinking something. A 92 
mean to reach this goal is to get some container, and so we screen the environment until we 93 
have, eventually, perceived the mug on the cupboard. Just as there are several cues the 94 
organism can use when perceiving objects, it can typically also choose among several means 95 
(e.g., drinking water from the tube) to reach a certain goal, and so the vicarious functioning of 96 
cues finds its correspondence in a vicarious functioning of means (Figure 1). 97 
Leary’s two lenses are adequate to describe daily activities such as drinking coffee. However, 98 
for more complex activities such as transforming a complex system (e.g., a city or a company) I 99 
propose to change the terminology a bit, and, more importantly, to add one more lens into the 100 
picture. The center of Leary’s figure is what he called the central response of the organism. I 101 
propose to refer to it as the organism’s representation (or, synonymously, the model) of some 102 
distal object. Given that the present extension is proposed to account for the planning of 103 
transitions of complex systems, I will henceforth replace the term objects by systems. 104 
Moreover, I propose to split up this representation of a system, the midpoint in Leary’s figure, 105 
                                                          
1  A provocative question may be allowed here: Where is the border? The surface of the eye, the retina, or 
eventually even the brain? Can the physical brain, including its activities at a given point in time, be conceived as 
part of the environment? And is the perception of an object located in the brain or must this perception be sharply 
distinguished from electric activities of the brain? (Note that the philosophy of the mind literature uses the term 
“qualia” to refer to a reality that cannot be reduced to physical patterns.) 
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into an is and an ought, and to connect these two states via a third lens which I will, henceforth, 106 
refer to as the planning lens (Figure 2). The is-state is the model that an individual or a group 107 
creates to understand a distal complex system. Typically, this model construction happens in a 108 
social context. For instance, some stakeholders may experience some dissatisfaction and 109 
initiate a process with the ultimately goal of changing the status quo. This is the context in 110 
which a planning team is assembled that typically starts by creating a model of the status quo. 111 
With the help of this model, the team may be able to convince the stakeholders that they have 112 
no reason to be dissatisfied, but this seems unrealistic. The more likely outcome is that the 113 
team, based on the problems they have identified in the model themselves, and based on its 114 
understanding of the stakeholders’ goals, enters a phase in which they draft an ought-state.  115 
How to find the ought-state and how to find the way from is to ought? There are two ways, 116 
bottom-up and top-down, which will be described next and in this order. Obviously, the 117 
planning lens can be located within the organism, here, the planning team. When the team 118 
develops various potential ought-states, it is “handling in the imaginary space.” Based on the 119 
model of the system, which includes an understanding of how the (distal) system is functioning, 120 
the team can simulate the outcomes of various manipulations. The anticipated effects of these 121 
manipulations can be obtained via mental simulations, but if the model of the system is precise 122 
enough to be cast in program code, these simulations may also be run on a computer. There is 123 
one important difference between the means in the planning lens (Figure 2) and those in the 124 
behavioral lens (Figure 1). Whereas the former are mental operators, the latter are real actions. 125 
A manipulation in the real world will have an effect in a real world, and there may be 126 
uncertainty when it comes to identifying this effect (in complex systems, one manipulation has 127 
most likely multiple effects, and one observation is most likely an effect of multiple causes—128 
which Brunswik in his TFP called stray effects and stray causes). In contrast, when introducing a 129 
manipulation in the planning lens, the effects are under the teams’ control, but the team 130 
members may be uncertain about which effects they should assume, and whether the effects in 131 
their simulated world will match those in the real world. Hence, not only the team’s 132 
representation of the present state of the system may be flawed, but also its expectations 133 
about which manipulations will lead to which outcomes. But these uncertainties involved in the 134 
planning of complex system transitions are exactly those features that invite the use of 135 
Brunswik’s TPF as a framework to model these processes (with a model construction lens and a 136 
planning lens, respectively). To wrap up, all these operations are performed by the planning 137 
team in an “imaginary space”. Different operations lead to different outcomes and the team, 138 
together with the stakeholders, can select which should be aimed for, that is, chosen as the 139 
ought-state.  140 
A top-down approach, in contrast, would be less constrained by the model of the is-state and 141 
by the repertoire of means. Such an approach starts in some future and may be inspired by the 142 
writings of Jules Verne. Let’s dream! Let’s create visions, let’s walk on the thin line between 143 
fantastic ideas and wild fantasies! The ought-states generated by such an approach will most 144 
likely appear to be more desirable compared to those generated by the bottom-up approach. 145 
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The problem may be to find operators and means that lead from is to ought, but chances are 146 
that ought-states generated by the top-down approach may inspire and motivate one to find 147 
means that were not in the initial behavioral repertoire. Obviously, the bottom-up approach 148 
and the top-down approach are not exclusive but may complement each other. The former 149 
focusses on the is-state and the means, the latter on the ought-state and the goals, but at the 150 
end both needs to be brought together. It may be useful, in order to make full use of the 151 
potential of a team, to follow both approaches, be it in temporal sequence or by splitting the 152 
team into subgroups, at least for a limited time during the planning process.  153 
Independent of whether the ought-state has been identified via the bottom-up approach, the 154 
top-down approach, or a mixture thereof, the planning team—or someone else, based on the 155 
planning team’s work—can now move forward, from the imaginary space to the real world. It is 156 
the ought-state and the experience made with the (mental or computer) simulations that 157 
informs the decision how to proceed, that is, which actions to implement in the real world in 158 
order to transform its present state and into a future state. Achievement could then be 159 
measured either by comparing the present state with a future state, or by comparing the 160 
ought-state with a future state. A result of such an evaluation that reflects these two different 161 
benchmarks could be: “Better than before, but not as good as envisioned and anticipated”. 162 
How are the three lenses—model construction, planning, and implementation—related to each 163 
other and how can the work of Scholz (in press) be extended in even other ways? The first lens 164 
captures how a system is represented. Different team members may find different aspects 165 
important. They may still be able to construct a model to which all can agree. Alternatively, 166 
they may not be able to find such an agreement, be it because they have unshared information 167 
that will not be communicated and revealed as such (Stasser & Titus, 1985; see also Reimer & 168 
Hoffrage, 2006), or because they cannot agree on assumptions that need to be made, on causal 169 
relationships, on extrapolations and predictions of future states, and so on. Conversely, note 170 
that the absence of any conflicts during the model construction phase does not necessarily 171 
imply that the team’s representation of the system is an accurate one (Janis, 1972). As these 172 
examples show, research on group processes offers multiple insights that could be used to 173 
complement Scholz’s cognitive perspective (see, e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Independently of 174 
whether groups amplify or attenuate biases of individuals, any flaws in the representation will 175 
jeopardize the planning and the ultimate success of the transition process. What is captured by 176 
the planning lens hinges on what happened during the model construction phase. Wrong 177 
assumptions and misrepresentations may lead to distorted results obtained in the imaginary 178 
space. Garbage in, garbage out. If the representation of the system is flawed, it may be hard to 179 
identify the resulting biases in the planning phase (see again, Janis, 1972). Chances are that the 180 
selection of means in the behavioral lens may be suboptimal as well and lead, in turn, to 181 
suboptimal outcomes. Note that the planning phase in Figure 2 is wider than the planning lens. 182 
Planning in the narrow sense, as captured by the middle lens, tackles the question of how to 183 
find an ought-state and how to get from is to ought. But planning in a wider sense is a process 184 
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that also includes model construction and implementation, that is, stretches into the two 185 
adjacent lenses. 186 
How does the present framework of the three lenses relate to the ideas presented in Scholz (in 187 
press)? Even though the sequence of three lens models is not visually displayed in the target 188 
article, one may argue that integrating his ideas into the framework presented in this 189 
commentary (and vice versa) would be easy. Space constraints did not allow for a more detailed 190 
conceptual analysis to verify or refute this suspicion. But apart from such a conceptual analysis, 191 
this question might also be treated as an empirical one. Scholz looks back at 21 large scale case 192 
studies, involving 97 planning teams, about 1300 master students and 2000 practitioners. These 193 
numbers are impressive and indicate how much effort and how many man-years went into all 194 
those activities. Scholz (in press) also points out that “As the above studies focused on 195 
sustainable transitioning of cases and not on how planning groups function, unfortunately no 196 
detailed data are available that provide in-depth information about the presence, functioning, 197 
and impacts of the proposed principles of TPF” (p. xx). While the requirements of planning 198 
groups working on real cases may not allow for experimental work, it may not be too hard to 199 
start in the lab and on a small scale. I would like to encourage Scholz and other scholars to 200 
conduct empirical research along the lines of what Scholz (in press) proposes in his section 5.3. 201 
One could, for instance, let several groups of Master students, who function as planning teams, 202 
work on the same case, but in isolation of each other. Prior to their planning activities, the 203 
groups could receive a different training, that is, they could be equipped with different 204 
theoretical frameworks and different tools. Another group of Master students could observe 205 
and document the processes that unfold in the different experimental conditions and, if such 206 
data can be obtained, eventually also evaluate their achievements. In one experimental 207 
conditions, groups could be familiarized with TFP only, in another condition with standard 208 
planning techniques only, in a third condition with the link between TFP and planning as 209 
proposed by Scholz (in press). Finally, if Scholz comes to the conclusion that the framework 210 
presented in this commentary is sufficiently different from his own framework, and if he finds it 211 
worth further investigations, he could implement a condition that allows one to determine 212 
which is more useful for (the training of) planning teams. The same can of course be said for 213 
other proposals of how to extend this work (e.g., made by other commentators). 214 
 215 
The goal to create and to have a sustainable future is something we can all agree on. But the 216 
devil is in the details, and people may disagree what sustainability entails and how to reach 217 
such a desired state. I close this commentary with a double-question. The first part is inspired 218 
by the warnings of the Club of Rome and various environmentalist movements: “Can we afford 219 
to continue with our way?” When considering the depletion of the planet’s resources, the 220 
answer should be a resounding “No.” But what is the alternative? “Can we afford to stop that 221 
way?” It seems many people are not willing to reduce their living standards substantially. In 222 
view of this dilemma, planning the necessary transitions into a sustainable future is 223 
indispensable and hard at the same time, in particular during a political climate of “alternative 224 
facts” in which even climate change is occasionally denied. I wish Scholz and his colleagues all 225 
the best with their attempts to help planning teams to navigate through these mine fields.  226 
  227 
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Figure 1: Extension of the lens model to behavior (Figure and caption taken from Leary, 1987, p. 253 
123).  254 
 255 
 256 
  257 
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Figure 2: Extension of the lens model to planning. 258 
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